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Abstract
This paper uses estimates of the dates at which different countries have experienced their
demographic transitions to examine the main historical determinants of these transitions. We
first show that genetic distance to the United Kingdom, a measure of cultural relatedness used
in Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009), is positively associated with the onset of the demographic
transition, implying that countries that have a larger genetic distance from the UK tend to
experience later transitions. We then unveil a plausible mechanism that can rationalize this
result. We show that genetic distance to the UK is negatively related to a country’s initial
human capital, measured as its schooling level in 1870. One interpretation of this finding is
that a larger genetic distance is associated with higher barriers to technological diffusion and
hence a lower demand for human capital. This low demand for human capital then delays the
demographic transition by providing less incentives for households to switch from quantity to
quality of children. Instrumenting initial human capital using genetic distance to the UK and
alternative measures of adherence to Protestantism, we confirm the causal link between human
capital and the onset of the demographic transition. Further, we show that the impact of cultural
relatedness to the UK can be mainly attributed to its effect on educational levels.
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1 Introduction
The transformation of an economy from a regime of Malthusian stagnation - a situation in which
income per capita any technological improvement is counterbalanced by a similar increase in the
population growth rate, so that income per capita fails to increase- to one of sustained growth
is fundamentally linked to the process of the demographic transition. By turning to negative the
relation between income and fertility, this transition plays a key role in fostering human-capital
investment and thus income growth (e.g. Galor and Weil, 1999; 2000). As a consequence, one would
expect that countries that first experienced the onset of demographic transition would be relatively
richer than those that experienced it later on or that have not yet experienced it. Figure 1 shows a
scatterplot of per-capita income in the year 2000 and the year at which each country experienced its
demographic transition. These dates have been estimated by Reher (2004) and identify permanent
declines in birth rates,1 assigning the year 2000 as the transition date for countries that had not
yet experienced the onset.2 The relation between these two variables is strongly negative, which
is consistent with the importance of experiencing a demographic transition to enter the sustained
growth regime.3
FIGURE 1 HERE
A recent strand of the literature highlights the role of culture in explaining economic development
across countries (Guiso et al., 2006; Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2009). Spolaore and Warcziarg (2009)
explain a significant fraction of income differences across countries using their genetic distance (rel-
ative to the technological frontier), which, according to their view, should measure barriers to the
adoption and diffusion of new technology from this frontier. Their measure of genetic distance cap-
tures the general relatedness between populations: the closer two populations are in terms of genetic
distance, the smaller their differences in traits and social norms (e.g., beliefs, habits, biases, etc.).
On the other hand, the literature emphasizes also the role of historical human capital in promoting a
country’s development. Expansion of education is often regarded as one of the fundamental factors
in economic development. Comparative analysis suggests that, among several factors, historical dif-
ferences in human capital might be responsible for different paths of development observed during
and after the colonization period. For example, Glaeser et al. (2004) argue that European set-
tlers brought their human capital where they settled in large numbers, thus fostering technological
progress, growth and better institutions.
Following Spolaore and Warcziarg (2009), who use genetic distance to the United Kingdom (UK)
and the United States (US) as a proxy for cultural relatedness to the technological frontier, we show
that genetic distance to the UK (US) has been important in shaping the timing of the fertility (or
demographic)transition across countries. This result is consistent with an indirect channel working
through technology diffusion as in Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009, 2011). Larger genetic distance to
the technological frontier would delay technology adoption and lower productivity and the demand
1These data has been recently used and cited in several papers like for instance Galor (2012) and Andersen et al.
(2010).
2We drop these 12 observations to avoid arbitrariness.
3Another channel through which the demographic transition may spur a country’s per-capita income is the so-
called demographic gift, by which a lower population growth rate decreases the dependency rate through its effect on
the population age structure (Bloom and Williamson, 1998).
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for human capital, consequently leading to a late onset of the fertility transition. The mechanism
we highlight here follows Galor and Weil (2000) who argue that increasing technological progress
boosts the demand for human capital and, because of the higher return to education, households
eventually trade quantity for quality of children. When a significant fraction of families decides to
have fewer and more educated children, the onset of demographic transition takes place. Therefore,
culture and informal institutions, by affecting incentives to innovate and accumulate human capital,
might have shaped the timing of fertility transitions and, consequently, the current distribution of
income across countries throughout the world. Our reasoning is that genetic distance to the UK,
through its effect on technology adoption and human capital accumulation, facilitate the onset of
the transition, but this does not necessarily mean that the technological frontier has to be the first
country to experience such transition.4
In our analysis we use the UK as the main reference country since it was the technological leader
until the early twentieth century. However, given that most of the fertility transitions in our sample
took place after 1950, we also consider using the US as the reference country.5 The timing of
the demographic transition differs widely across countries, as shown in Table 1, which lists the
years at which the different countries reached their demographic transition as estimated in Reher
(2004). Figure 2 displays a histogram of these dates.6 As the data show, most of the countries
that experienced the transition in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, were located in Western
Europe. In contrast, most countries belonging to Asia, Africa, and Latin America experienced a
late transition (that is, after 1950).
TABLE 1 HERE
FIGURE 2 HERE
In this paper we exploit cross-country variation to shed light on the determinants of the fertility tran-
sition around the world. Several mechanisms have been proposed to explain the fertility transition:
a rise in the demand for human capital (Galor and Weil, 2000), a rise in income during industrializa-
tion (Becker and Lewis, 1973; Becker, 1981), a reduction in child and infant mortality rates (Coale,
1973; van de Walle, 1986; Sah, 1991; Galloway et al., 1998; Eckstein et al., 1999; Kalemli-Ozcan,
2002), and a reduction in gender gaps (Galor and Weil, 1996; Goldin, 1990; and Lagerlo¨f, 2003).7
Data limitations prevent us to run a formal horserace between these competing explanations of the
triggers of the demographic transition. Instead, our goal is to explore the contribution of a specific
variable to this process and rationalize the mechanism through which it operates. In particular,
here we focus on a country’s cultural relatedness to the technological frontier and show that its
impact can be mainly attributed to its effect on human capital accumulation. We also test whether
other measures of historical institutions - executive constraints and polity2 scores- are related to the
4There are other factors that are important in explaining the onset of fertility transitions across countries. In fact,
the UK, which belongs to the group of ”early” transitions (i.e. before 1950) is not the first country experiencing the
onset - Sweden had its transition in 1865, according to Reher.
5In our largest sample 23 out of 124 countries experienced the onset of the transition before 1950, excluding the
countries assigned a transition in the year 2000.
6Some of Reher’s onset dates differ from other sources (Coale and Watkins, 1986 and Bailey, 2009). In Sections
3.3 and 4.3 we check the robustness of our results using alternative dates.
7Guinnane (2011) and Galor (2012) provide reviews of the factors behind fertility transitions.
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onset of the demographic transition across countries. Contrary to the proxy of informal institutions
(i.e. genetic distance), these alternative measures of historical formal institutions do not show a
robust relationship with the year of the onset. This result is consistent with cultural relatedness
to technological frontier favouring technology adoption (Spolaore and Wacziarg 2009, 2011) which
foster human capital accumulation and the onset of the fertility transition (Galor, 2012). Figure 3
shows a strong positive correlation between the demographic transition years and genetic distance
to the UK.
The main findings of our paper can be summarized as follows. First, a large genetic distance with
respect to the UK (US) delays a country’s demographic transition. Second, when we instrument a
country’s schooling levels in 1870 with genetic distance to the UK and the percentage of Protestants
in the population -or alternatively with a country’s physical distance from Germany- we find a strong
causal effect of human capital on the onset of the demographic transition, as predicted by Galor
and Weil (2000).The mechanism behind this relationship is as follows. Genetic proximity to the UK
enhances a country’s demand for human capital. Protestantism, on the other hand, is associated
with a boost in the supply of human capital. These two effects enhance human capital accumulation
which in turn induces families to reduce their offspring, triggering the demographic transition.
FIGURE 3 HERE
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the sparse empirical literature that has at-
tempted to isolate different triggers of demographic transitions across countries. Section 3 describes
the data and methodology used in the analysis. Section 4 presents the finding that genetic distance
from the UK is a robust determinant of the onset of the demographic transition across countries.
Section 5 illustrates the mechanism at work. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature Review
Since our contribution is purely empirical, in this section we limit ourselves to discussing the empir-
ical papers that analyze possible triggers of demographic (or fertility) transitions.8 In the tradition
of the so-called ”demographic transition theory” (Notestein, 1945), the Princeton European Fertility
Project (e.g., see Coale and Watkins, 1986) was one of the first comprehensive studies that used data
from the 19th century to document different demographic transitions in Europe and analyze their
possible triggers. The emphasis in this project, however, was mainly on cultural and sociological
explanations, ignoring economic factors. More recently, the development of unified growth theories
that seek to explain economic growth in the very long run has spurred interest in identifying the
role of different socio-economic factors in explaining demographic transitions.
The first–and most common– methodological approach has been to study the correlation between
fertility and income at different time periods. For instance, using a sample of countries in the
1960-1999 period, Lehr (2009) examines the existence of different regimes in terms of fertility dy-
namics. She finds that, at early stages of development, increases in productivity and primary
schooling-enrolment are typically associated with increases in fertility. In contrast, at higher levels
8The literature review in Galor (2012) also includes theoretical papers.
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of development, productivity and education are shown to be negatively associated with fertility,
whereas the level of parents’ human capital has a somewhat positive effect. In all periods, increases
in secondary-schooling enrolment are correlated with drops in fertility rates. Murtin (2012) uses
data for a large panel of countries since 1870 and concludes that education is the main trigger of
changes in the birth rate and that the effect of health improvements is of second order. Becker
et al. (2010) use data on Prussian counties in 1849 and identify a positive relationship between
child quantity and education in a context in which the demographic transition has not yet taken
place. Another finding of their study is that the initial level of education is a good predictor of
the demographic transition that occurred in Prussia during the 1880-1905 period. Finally, Murphy
(2009) analyzes historical French de´partement data for the late 19th century and finds that both
economic and cultural factors had an effect on different fertility patterns across these geographical
units. In particular, education, measured as female literacy and child enrolment in primary schools,
has a negative impact on fertility, whereas wealth is correlated with larger family sizes.9
A different approach is to use information on the years of the onset of demographic transitions in
different countries to directly identify their main historical determinants. Andersen et al. (2010)
use this strategy to analyze how cataract incidence explain cross-country variation in labour pro-
ductivity. They argue that an earlier onset of vision loss reduces the return to human capital, and
hence delays the demographic transition.
3 Data and Methodology
3.1 Baseline analysis
In our baseline analysis our main variable of interest is a proxy of informal institutions. Specifi-
cally we consider a measure of cultural relatedness, genetic distance to the UK (or the US) taken
from Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) -SW henceforth- aiming to capture cultural proximity to the
technological frontier.10
We first investigate the effect of genetic distance to the UK on the timing of the fertility transition
across countries by estimating the following model using ordinary least squares (OLS):11
log onseti = β1 + β2 ∗ log gendisti,UK + β′3Xi + εi (1)
9There are several studies that focus on the closely related children’s quantity-quality trade-off. For instance,
Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980) were the first to use exogenous variations in fertility to identify the effect of child
quantity on child quality. They instrumented child quantity with increases in family size resulting from multiple
births and show that child quantity significantly reduces children’s education. Bleakley and Lange (2009) explore the
causal effect of education on fertility by exploiting the eradication policy of the hookworm disease in southern states
in North America. Their paper argues that this eradication increased the return to schooling and hence reduced
the price of child quality. This exogenous change, in turn, increased school attendance and reduced fertility. Other
relevant papers are Angrist et al. (2005), Black et al. (2005), and Qian (2009). See Schultz (2008) for a summary of
this literature.
10Throughout our analysis we use the measure weighted genetic distance that accounts for sub-populations’ genetic
groups. The other measure provided by Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009), named dominant genetic distance, considers
only the largest groups of each country’s population.
11We take logs of the two key variables to reduce the impact of outliers.
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where log onseti represents (the log of) the year of the onset of the demographic transition in
country i, log gendisti,UK represents (the log of) genetic distance to the UK in country i, Xi is
a set of country i control variables, and ε is a standard error term. Xi includes different sets of
standard determinants of long-run development and productivity used in the literature. To account
for the potential effect of geography and climate, we control for the absolute latitude of a country’s
centroid, the average distance to the nearest ice-free coast, the malaria ecology index, and a set of
continental dummies (Africa, Asia, Europe, North America, and South America). The historical
variables included in the regressions are population density in 1400 and the years passed since the
Neolithic revolution (i.e. the agricultural transition).12 We also control for the type of legal origins
(British common law, French civil law, socialist law, German civil law, and Scandinavian law) and
the 1900 shares of protestants, catholics and muslims.13
Table 2 in the Appendix contains the definitions and sources of all the variables used in the cross-
sectional exercise.
TABLE 2 HERE
3.2 Bilateral analysis
In this section we follow an approach similar to SW. We assess whether the role of cultural relat-
edness to the technological frontier as a determinant of the demographic transition is still present
using a bilateral approach considering countries pair by pair. One advantage of this approach is that
it makes use of a much larger dataset and so it helps increasing the precision of our estimates. To do
so, we regress the distance in the onset of the demographic transition between each pair of countries
on their genetic distance relative to the UK (US) and on a set of controls very similar to those of
SW aimed at capturing geographical, climatic, and historical differences which can be interpreted
as distances. We account for the effect of geographical distances by including the absolute difference
in latitudes and longitudes, the geodesic distance between countries, a dummy that takes a value
of one if both countries in the pair are contiguous, a dummy that takes a value of one if at least
one country is landlocked, a dummy that takes a value of one if at least one country is an island,
and a measure of climatic similarity based on 12 Koeppen-Geiger climate zones.14 We also add as
covariates a set of dummies that take a value of one if two countries in a pair are located in the same
continent. We include a measure of transportation costs based on freight rates for surface transport
(sea or land).15 To control for common historical and cultural characteristics we use a dummy
taking a value of one if both countries in a pair share the same legal origins, and zero otherwise; a
dummy taking a value of one if both countries in a pair share the same colonial origins, and zero
otherwise; and a dummy taking a value of one if both countries share a common official language.
As for climate, religious similarity is measures with the average absolute value difference, between
two countries, in the percentages of religions followers in 1900 in each of 10 religious categories. All
12Data on the agricultural transition are from Louis Putterman’s Agricultural Transition Year Country Data Set.
13Religion adherence is particularly important in our context as some religions differed substantially in the promotion
of literacy and education (Ferguson, 2011).
14This is measured as the average absolute value difference in the percentage of land area in each of the 12 climate
zones between two countries.
15Transportation-cost data is from http://www.importexportwizard.com/. The measure refers to 1000kg of unspec-
ified freight transported over sea or land, with no special handling.
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variables used in this section, along with their sources, are listed in Table 4 of the Appendix. Our
estimation model in this case is the following:
|log onseti − log onsetj | = α+ β|log gendisti,UK − log gendistj,UK |+ γ′Qi,j + i,j (2)
where |log onseti − log onsetj | represents the absolute value of the log difference in the year of the
onset of the demographic transition between country i and j, |log gdi,UK − log gdj,UK | represents
the absolute value of the genetic (log) distance relative to the UK between country i and j and Qi,j
includes the mentioned measures of geographical, climatic and historical distances between country
i and j. Finally, i,j is the error term associated with the country pair ij.
16 This approach allows
us to investigate whether differences (and similarities) in culture (relative to the UK and the US)
explain the distance in the timing of the onset of demographic transitions between pairs of countries.
Specifically, we ask whether similar (different) timing in the onset is explained by similar (different)
culture (relative to the UK and US), controlling for the effect of similar (different) geographical,
climatic, and historical contexts.
TABLE 3 HERE
3.3 Robustness checks
Next we perform two robustness checks. First, we use alternative dates for the onset of fertility
transitions for those who experienced an ”early transition”. Reher’s dates might be criticized
especially for some countries as France which are assigned a relatively late onset. To account for
this, we use dates from Coale and Watkins (1986) and Bailey (2009) which are directly related to
the European Fertility Project. Using alternative onset dates is a sensible thing to do, since some
of Reher dates have been criticized on two grounds. First, some of the ”early” transitions in Reher
seem to take place too late. This seems to be the case for instance in France, where other sources
suggest that the demographic transition took place around 1827 rather than 1900. Second, there
seems to be too much bunching across demographic transition years in the Reher estimates- all the
dates occur precisely at the beginning of a decade or exactly in the middle of it. Table 4 shows the
discrepancies in the dates calculated by Reher (2004), Coale and Watkins (1986) and Bailey (2009).
The first thing to notice is that the discrepancies only occur in Western countries, the ones that were
the focus of Coale and Watkins (1986) and Bailey (2009). Second, the Coale-Watkins dates and
the Bailey’s ones are very similar in most cases. One exception is France, for which Coale-Watkins
estimate that the demographic transition took place in 1827, while Bailey’s date is 1814. There
is also a ten year discrepancy for the case of Hungary. Most importantly, the Coale-Watkins and
Bailey dates precede the Reher one’s in all cases except for Hungary, Spain, and Sweden.
TABLE 4 HERE
16As Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) point out, spatial correlation results from the construction of the dependent
variable. We follow their strategy to address this issue by using two-way clustered standard errors.
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The second robustness check we perform is to control for alternative measures of formal historical
institutions, namely executive constraints and an index of democracy scores in 1850 and 1900.17
Although there is no formal theory that directly links the demographic transition to the quality
of institutions it can be the case that human capital promotion is enhanced by a well-functioning
institutional framework.
4 Results: genetic distance to the technological frontier and the
onset of fertility transition
4.1 Cross-section baseline regressions
Following SW, genetic distance might indirectly affect the timing of the fertility decline as it proxies
for a cultural environment favourable to technological progress and adoption of innovations. This
would favour education and human capital accumulation, then triggering an earlier onset of the
demographic transition (Galor, 2012). Here we test for the existence of this indirect channel. In
Section 5 we will provide evidence suggesting that this mechanism is plausible and that the effect of
genetic distance from the technological frontier on the timing of the onset of the fertility transition
is accounted by historical levels of educational attainments.
Table 5 shows the estimation results obtained by regressing the timing of the fertility transition on
genetic distance to the UK. Specification 1 simply uses the log of genetic distance to the UK as
regressor. Its impact is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that a larger genetic distance
from the UK (i.e. a larger difference in the cultural environment with respect to the technological
frontier) delays the onset of the demographic transition. This estimate is qualitatively similar if
one adds geography and climate, history, legal origins, and religion as controls. Including all these
regressors simultaneously in the same specification does not significantly alter the results (column
6); the same applies when considering genetic distance to the US (column 7) which, as mentioned
above, it may be considered the technological frontier after 1950. 18
The size of these estimates is quantitatively important. The coefficients from specification (6)
suggest that, for instance, if Lesotho had been culturally as similar –in terms of genetic distance– to
the British population as Spain, then it would have experienced a demographic transition twenty-
eight years earlier than what the model predicts (in 1944 rather than 1972).19
TABLE 5 HERE
17The variables we use are xconst and polity2 from the data set Polity IV and measure a country’s institutional
framework. See Marshall and Jaggers (2008) for a detailed description.
18The coefficient associated with a quadratic term - not reported here - is negative in all but the last two spec-
ifications, suggesting nonlinearities in the relationship between the timing of the DT and genetic distance to the
technological frontier.
19To calculate this effect we use the values of the different covariates for Lesotho and Spain and the estimates of
the different parameters to compute their predicted log transition year and we then use the exponential function to
find out the actual year.
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4.2 Bilateral analysis
Table 6 shows the OLS estimates obtained from the regression in equation (2). In column (1),
where we do not add any control variable, larger differences in genetic distance (relative to the UK)
are associated with larger time distances in the onset of demographic transition. In columns (2) to
(5), we add different controls. In particular, column (2) adds measures of geographical differences,
column (3) includes a measure of climatic similarity, column (4) includes a set of continental dum-
mies, whereas column (5) adds the measure of transportation costs described above. Throughout all
specifications, including column (6) where we add all the controls, larger genetic distances (relative
to the UK) are associated with wider differences in the timing of the fertility transition. In columns
(7)-(9) we add controls for similar legal origins, colonial history, language and religion, respectively.
The inclusion of these variables affects neither the significance nor the size of the coefficient as-
sociated with the difference in genetic distance relative to the UK. These results again provide
strong evidence of the importance of cultural differences–specifically relative to the technological
frontier–in determining international differences in the onset of the demographic transition.
TABLE 6 HERE
4.3 Robustness checks
Using alternative dates of the onset of fertility decline for some of the transitions (mainly ”early”
ones, which correspond to Western countries) does not alter our main result as it can be noticed by
looking at Table 7.20 If anything, the association is strengthened as, in all cases, the coefficients of
interest are larger in absolute value using these onset dates.
TABLE 7 HERE
We also test the role of formal institutions on the timing of demographic transition using different
proxies as executive constraints and a democracy index scores measured in 1850 and 1900 (from
the data set Polity IV, see Marshall and Jaggers 2008). The question we ask here is whether the
effect of genetic distance to the technological frontier on the timing of the onset of the fertility
transition is robust to controlling for early formal institutions.21 Consistent with our hypothesis,
Table 8 shows that the effect of genetic distance to the UK is still positive and significant in spite
of the considerable drop in the number of observations while these proxies of formal institutions do
not have a significant effect.
TABLE 8 HERE
20For the sake of brevity we only report the results using the alternative dates from Coale and Watkins (1986).
Considering the Bailey (2009) dates gives us almost identical estimates.
21When using measures of formal institutional quality in 1900 we exclude four countries that experienced the onset
of the transition before (or in 1900) to avoid reverse causality issues. These are: Hungary, Germany, Sweden and
Uruguay.
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5 Verification of the mechanism: genetic distance to technological
frontier, education and fertility transition
In this section we provide evidence supporting the channel of causation we think might be driving our
results. Specifically we show that the impact of cultural relatedness to the technological frontier on
the onset of fertility transition can be attributed mainly to its effect on human capital accumulation.
This is consistent with the idea that cultural relatedness to the technological frontier favoured
technology adoption (Spolaore and Wacziarg 2009, 2011) which in turn fostered human capital
accumulation and the onset of the fertility transition (Galor, 2012).
As a first step we show that genetic distance to the technological frontier is an important determinant
of historical educational attainments. We use average years of education in the population aged
15-64 from Morrisson and Murtin (2009) in the year 1870 to capture historical schooling levels.
As we can notice in Table 9, genetic distance to the UK has a negative and significant effect on
schooling in 1870, in line with our reasoning, even after controlling for geography and climate, legal
origins, history and religion.
TABLE 9 HERE
Our strategy to disentangle the mechanism at work goes as follows. We use genetic distance to the
UK as an instrument for schooling levels in 1870 to assess the impact of historical education levels
on the timing of the onset of fertility transitions across countries. In order to show that we can
plausibly argue that genetic distance to the UK affected the onset of fertility transitions only through
education –by favouring technology adoption– we use additional instruments so that we can use an
overidentification test to check whether the instruments are valid. The additional instruments we
use are the share of Protestants in 1900 and a country’s (log) distance from Germany. The former
is likely to capture heterogeneity in the incentives to get educated. As Ferguson (2011, pp. 259)
points out, adherents to Protestantism had a big incentive to become educated, in order to be able
to read and interpret the Bible by themselves –a crucial element of Protestantism–:
”Because of the central importance in Luther’s thought of individual reading of the
Bible, Protestantism encouraged literacy, not to mention printing, and these two things
unquestionably encouraged economic development (the accumulation of ’human capital’)
as well as scientific study. This proposition holds good not just for countries like Scot-
land, where spending on education, school enrolment and literacy rates were exceptionally
high, but for the Protestant world as a whole. Wherever Protestant missionaries went,
they promoted literacy, with measurable long-term benefits to the societies they sought to
educate; the same cannot be said of Catholic missionaries throughout the period of the
Counter-Reformation to the reforms of the Second Vatican Council (1962-5)”
Following Ferguson’s argument, we also use as an additional instrument the (log) distance to Ger-
many. This would capture the heterogeneity in the spread of the Protestant reform which started
in Germany in the early 16th century.22
22The logic is similar to Becker et al. (2010) who use distance to Wittenberg as an instrument for education in a
cross-county framework in 19th century Prussia.
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Table 10 displays the results from the first and second stage of the IV regressions. We run regres-
sions without additional controls in columns (1,2,5,6) and including the controls used previously,
that is geography and climate, history and legal origins (columns 3,4,7,8). As it can be noticed,
the instruments are well correlated with the endogenous variable and in all cases we cannot reject
the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid. The Hansen-J test checks if genetic distance to
the UK and the additional instrument have an effect on the onset of fertility transitions that goes
beyond their effect on initial (historical) educational attainments. As we cannot reject instruments
validity throughout all specifications, it’s likely that genetic distance (which should capture cul-
tural differences) with respect to the technological frontier affected the onset of fertility transitions
through education and human capital accumulation. This result is in line with the reasoning that
cultural distance to the technological frontier affected the diffusion of technology and this, conse-
quently, affected the incentives for human capital accumulation, the quantity-quality trade off and
the timing of the onset of fertility decline.
As we saw above, the estimated coefficients have a strong economic significance. Using the estimates
from the last column of Table 10 we can make the following calculation. Suppose it would have
been possible to rise the schooling level of a country like India in 1870 to the level of Switzerland,
keeping everything else constant. In that case, our IV model predicts that India would have then
experienced its demographic transition in 1925, rather than in 1966, forty-one years earlier.
TABLE 10 HERE
6 Conclusion
This paper contributes to our understanding of the main determinants of the demographic transi-
tions across a large sample of rich and developing countries. We provide evidence suggesting that
a specific type of informal institutions - or culture-, genetic distance to the technological frontier
(the UK or the US), has been a crucial factor of the timing of the fertility transition across these
economies. We provide evidence that genetic distance to the technological frontier affected the tim-
ing of the onset of the fertility transitions through an indirect channel working through technology
diffusion as suggested in Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009, 2011). A larger genetic distance to the
technological frontier would delay technology adoption and lower the demand for human capital,
consequently leading to a late onset of the fertility transition (Galor, 2012). We first estimate a
reduced form regression in which genetic distance to the UK is a strongly significant variable in
explaining the timing of the demographic transitions across countries, even after controlling for
a large set of geographical and historical variables. We show that these estimates are robust to
considering a bilateral analysis that compares pairs of countries in terms of their onsets of the
demographic transitions and their differences in terms of their distance to the UK and to different
estimates of the demographic transition dates. Finally, we unveil a plausible mechanism that may
be behind this reduced form. A large cultural difference with respect to the UK may be proxying
a lower technological adoption and less incentives to accumulate human capital, which in turn may
delay the onset of the demographic transition. We test this possible channel by instrumenting a
country’s initial levels of human capital with genetic distance from the UK, and two measure of the
degree of spread of Protestantism, a religion known for its emphasis on the promotion of human
capital among its followers. Our finding that cultural characteristics matter as triggers of demo-
11
graphic transitions may be seen as a bridge between the literature that emphasizes the importance
of economic determinants of these transitions (e.g. Galor, 2012) and the one that points to purely
cultural factors (e.g. Coale and Watkins, 1986).
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Table 1: Reher’s (2004) estimates of the onset of the demographic transition
Albania 1965 Denmark 1910 Korea, Rep. 1960 Portugal 1925
Algeria 1975 Djibouti 1985 Korea, Dem. Rep. 1970 Qatar 1955
Angola 1995 Dominican Rep. 1965 Kuwait 1975 Romania 1935
Antigua 1960 Ecuador 1970 Kyrgyzstan 1965 Rwanda 1995
Argentina 1910 Egypt 1965 Laos 1995 Saudi Arabia 1980
Armenia 1965 El Salvador 1965 Lebanon 1965 Senegal 1980
Austria 1915 Eritrea 1990 Lesotho 1985 Seychelles 1955
Azerbaijan 1965 Ethiopia 1990 Liberia 1995 Singapore 1955
Bahamas 1965 Finland 1915 Libya 1980 South Africa 1975
Bahrain 1970 France 1900 Madagascar 1990 Spain 1910
Bangladesh 1980 Gambia 1985 Malawi 1980 Sri Lanka 1960
Barbados 1955 Georgia 1965 Malaysia 1965 Sudan 1980
Belgium 1905 Germany 1900 Mali 1995 Suriname 1965
Belize 1965 Ghana 1985 Mauritania 1980 Swaziland 1975
Benin 1985 Guatemala 1985 Mauritius 1960 Sweden 1865
Bhutan 1995 Guinea 1995 Mexico 1970 Switzerland 1910
Bolivia 1975 Guyana 1965 Mongolia 1975 Syria 1985
Botswana 1975 Haiti 1985 Morocco 1965 Taiwan 1955
Brazil 1965 Honduras 1985 Myanmar (Burma) 1975 Tanzania 1975
Brunei 1960 Hungary 1890 Namibia 1990 Thailand 1965
Bulgaria 1925 India 1960 Nepal 1995 Togo 1985
Burundi 1995 Indonesia 1970 Netherlands 1910 Trinidad and Tobago 1965
Cameroon 1980 Iran 1985 Nicaragua 1985 Tunisia 1965
Canada 1905 Iraq 1975 Niger 1985 Turkmenistan 1965
Central Afr. R. 1990 Israel 1955 Nigeria 1995 United Kingdom 1910
Chile 1960 Italy 1925 Norway 1905 United States 1925
China 1970 Ivory Coast 1985 Oman 1995 Uruguay 1890
Colombia 1965 Jamaica 1925 Panama 1970 Uzbekistan 1965
Comoros 1990 Japan 1950 Paraguay 1985 Venezuela 1965
Costa Rica 1965 Jordan 1975 Peru 1975 Vietnam 1980
Cuba 1920 Kenya 1980 Philippines 1955 Zambia 1980 Zimbabwe 1970
Excluding countries that were assigned the onset in the year 2000. These are: Afghanistan, Burkina
Faso, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, Sierra
Leone, Somalia, Uganda, Yemen.
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Table 4: Alternative fertility transitions dates
Country Reher Coale-Watkins Bailey
Austria 1915 1907 1908
Belgium 1905 1881 1882
Denmark 1910 1898 1899
England 1905 1892 1892
Finland 1915 1912 1911
France 1900 1827 1814
Hungary 1890 1910 1900
Italy 1925 1913 1912
Netherlands 1910 1897 1897
Norway 1905 1903 1904
Portugal 1925 1916 1916
Russia 1922 1922
Spain 1910 1920 1919
Sweden 1865 1902 1897
Switzerland 1910 1887 1886
Coale and Watkins (1986) also provide transition dates for Germany, Greece, Ireland, Russia, and
Scotland. We omit those here since Reher does not include these countries in his sample. Bailey
(2009) adds Bulgaria and Wales to this list.
Table 5: Cross-section OLS: determinants of the onset of fertility transitions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(Log) Genetic distance 0.0093*** 0.0024** 0.0106*** 0.0085*** 0.004** 0.0034**
to the UK [0.0008] [0.0012] [0.0011] [0.0008] [0.0017] [0.0016]
(Log) Genetic distance 0.0055*
to the USA [0.0028]
Geography and climate no yes no no yes yes yes
History no no yes no yes yes yes
Legal origins no no no yes yes yes yes
Religion no no no no no yes yes
R-squared 0.49 0.73 0.53 0.61 0.78 0.81 0.8
Observations 124 116 114 124 109 108 108
**, **,* denotes statistical significance at 1% , 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Estimation with ro-
bust standard errors (reported in squared brackets). All regressions include a constant. Dependent
variable: (Log) Onset of the demographic transition as in Reher (2004).
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Table 7: Cross-section OLS: alternative onset dates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(Log) Genetic distance 0.0106*** 0.004*** 0.0121*** 0.01*** 0.0051*** 0.0044***
to the UK [0.0011] [0.0014] [0.0013] [0.0014] [0.0014] [0.0013]
(Log) Genetic distance 0.0064***
to the USA [0.0022]
Geography and climate no yes no no yes yes yes
History no no yes no yes yes yes
Legal origins no no no yes yes yes yes
Religion no no no no no yes yes
R-squared 0.53 0.73 0.58 0.6 0.78 0.8 0.79
Observations 124 116 114 124 109 108 108
**, **,* denotes statistical significance at 1% , 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Estimation with
robust standard errors (reported in squared brackets). All regressions include a constant. De-
pendent variable: (Log) Onset of the demographic transition as in Reher (2004) and Coale and
Watkins (1986).
Table 8: Cross-section OLS: alternative measures of historical institutions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(Log) Genetic distance to the UK 0.0077*** 0.0079*** 0.0071** 0.0073***
[0.0025] [0.0025] [0.0025] [0.0024]
(Log of) Executive constraints in 1850 -0.0007
[0.0014]
Polity2 in 1850 0.0001
[0.0003]
(Log of) Executive constraints in 1900 -0.0019
[0.0017]
Polity2 in 1900 -0.0001
[0.0002]
Geography and climate yes yes yes yes
History yes yes yes yes
Legal origins yes yes yes yes
R-squared 0.9 0.9 0.91 0.91
Observations 36 36 39 39
**, **,* denotes statistical significance at 1% , 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Estimation with
robust standard errors (reported in squared brackets). All regressions include a constant. Dependent
variable: (Log) Onset of the demographic transition as in Reher (2004). In columns (3,4) onsets
taking place before 1900 are dropped.
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Table 9: Cross-section OLS: determinants of historical schooling levels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(Log) Genetic distance -1.009*** -0.4709* -1.1583** -0.9417*** -0.7135** -0.9101***
to the UK [0.1355] [0.2393] [0.1893] [0.1522] [0.2741] [0.2564]
(Log) Genetic distance -1.592***
to the USA [0.5778]
Geography and climate no yes no no yes yes yes
History no no yes no yes yes yes
Legal origins no no no yes yes yes yes
Religion no no no no no yes yes
R-squared 0.52 0.66 0.59 0.68 0.77 0.85 0.83
Observations 68 67 66 68 65 65 65
**, **,* denotes statistical significance at 1% , 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Estimation with ro-
bust standard errors (reported in squared brackets). All regressions include a constant. Dependent
variable: average years of schooling in the population aged 15-64 in 1870.
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Figure 1: Onset of the demographic transition and GDP per capita in 2000
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Figure 2: Year of the onset of the demographic transition (Reher, 2004)
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Figure 3: Genetic distance to the UK and the onset of the demographic transition
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